| 1 | COURT OF APPEALS | | | |
|----|--|--------|--------------------------|-------|
| 2 | STATE OF NEW YORK | | | |
| 3 | ELIZABETH REICH AND STANLEE BRIMBERG, | _ | | |
| 4 | ELIZADEIN REICH AND STANLEE BRIMDERG, | | | |
| 5 | Appellants, | | | |
| 6 | -against- | NO. 4 | 1 | |
| 7 | BELNORD PARTNERS, LLC AND EXTELL BELNORD, LLC, | 110. | 1 | |
| 8 | Respondents. | | | |
| 9 | | A | 20 Eagle S lbany, New | York |
| 10 | Before: | Ċ | January 7, | 2020 |
| 11 | CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIC | ORE. | | |
| 12 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RI | VERA | _ | |
| 13 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. | | | |
| 14 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. V | | | |
| 15 | ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEI | | | |
| 16 | Annoarangog | | | |
| 10 | Appearances: | | | |
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| 25 | Offici | aı COl | urt Transc | rrner |



| 1 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The next appeal on this |
|----|---|
| 2 | afternoon's calendar is appeal number 4, Reich v. Belnord |
| 3 | Partners. |
| 4 | Good afternoon, again, Counsel. |
| 5 | MR. VERNON: Your Honors, may it please the |
| 6 | court, again, my name is Darryl Vernon. I'm here with |
| 7 | Yoram Silagy. We're here for the appellants, the tenants. |
| 8 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Now you may request your |
| 9 | rebuttal time, sir. |
| 10 | MR. VERNON: And now, may I have two minutes |
| 11 | rebuttal? |
| 12 | CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may. |
| 13 | MR. VERNON: And in the prior case, too. |
| 14 | JUDGE WILSON: And if I had paid closer attention |
| 15 | to appearances of counsel, I would have asked you the |
| 16 | McMaster question. So can I start there? |
| 17 | MR. VERNON: The McMaster |
| 18 | JUDGE WILSON: You're also here you're also |
| 19 | here on a certified question. And McMaster, I know was |
| 20 | raised in in this appeal. And so I'm wondering how |
| 21 | you get by the language there that says as I read it, |
| 22 | at least if there's an intervening new piece of |
| 23 | legislation, but the cases come up on a certified question, |
| 24 | we can only answer whether the Appellate Division was |
| 25 | correct on the basis of the law as it was at the time that |

1 the Appellate Division decided the case. 2 MR. VERNON: So I read McMaster - - - and I know 3 it's cited in this case - - - to say that they did not 4 consider the statute on appeal because it was found 5 unconstitutional. That was the reason they didn't find it 6 at con - - - on appeal. And the - - - in the other cases 7 that this court has decided, meaning Post, where they found 8 there was a right to cure, even after the case was going on 9 - - - a serious change; in the Boardwalk case, where it 10 plainly just applied on appeal - - - and in that case the court put - - - this court put it very well. They said you 11 12 cannot affirm something in violation of the law. 13 So to the - - - the law clearly says it applies 14 to pending claims. We have a pending claim, no doubt. 15 It's up on - - -16 JUDGE FAHEY: Does - - - does it matter in 17 McMaster that that was a case that was decided on 18 reargument? MR. VERNON: No, I don't - - -19 20 JUDGE FAHEY: Have you thought about that? How 21 about - - -22 MR. VERNON: - - - think - - - I haven't thought 23 about - - -24 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - its relat - - -25 - - - that. But I don't think that MR. VERNON:



| would matter. I think the key issue is, is it still |
|--|
| pending. |
| JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. |
| MR. VERNON: And certainly for for purposes |
| of this statute |
| JUDGE FAHEY: I see. |
| MR. VERNON: which says a claim is pending. |
| JUDGE FAHEY: How about in the context of the |
| Robinson case? Are you familiar with that? |
| MR. VERNON: No. I didn't see that cited in the |
| briefs. |
| JUDGE FAHEY: All right, well, it it was a |
| year before. It was a Court of Appeals Case. And it was a |
| case where a procedural statute was applied to pending |
| appeals. |
| MR. VERNON: Um-hum. |
| JUDGE FAHEY: And I think the two cases may have |
| to be read together, for our purposes, they're so close in |
| time, in terms of |
| MR. VERNON: I see. |
| JUDGE FAHEY: analysis. |
| But if you're not familiar with it, it's okay. |
| MR. VERNON: I I apologize. |
| JUDGE FAHEY: No, it's not a problem. |
| MR. VERNON: But I would like to address I |
| |

know Your Honor's concerned with repose. And I - - - and I - - - and I - - - and I istening and trying to address it and would like to take the opportunity.

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Landlords do have repose. And - - - and to some extent, nobody has repose, because statutes change. So tenants didn't have repose when, for example, there was a point where they couldn't live together if they weren't married. And - - - and the laws changed, finally.

And so there have been serious changes on both sides. And - - - and there was a time when tenants couldn't be evicted in luxury deregulation. There was a time tenants couldn't get evicted in owner occupancy, under certain grounds. And that expanded. So things do change.

But the repose that the landlord has is: a) he only is going to owe the number of years that is up to six years. The second is, they don't need records forever.

They just need to keep some reasonable records. It doesn't have to be six years. It could be seven. As long as they have something, they have repose.

The cases we're all talking about, number one, hardly ever happen because I would lose out on so many years of overcharges if I'm bringing a case ten, twenty years later. My proof problems, as a tenant, would be miserable.

So there is repose. And it's not much different



1 than other cases where you sue someone within the deadline, 2 you can only get a certain amount, but a lot of the proof 3 is from things you did years and years ago. I - - - you 4 know, I built the elevator twenty years ago, and something 5 was wrong with it. 6 So I don't - - - I don't think the repose question is so problematic, and nor do I think it's 7 8 entirely dispositive of why this statute should apply. 9 think the key is that the legislature said they want it to 10 apply. And they did indeed express all about the remedial 11 12 JUDGE GARCIA: But most of the time - - -13 MR. VERNON: - - - intent - - - sorry. 14 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - you have a - - -15 MR. VERNON: Sorry. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: The ones I know of, you have a 17 statute of limitations that says a certain number of years from X, you have to bring a claim. What is the X here? 18 19 MR. VERNON: Okay, the X is from - - - you have 20 to - - - well, I'm sorry. There never has been an actual 21 deadline by which you have to bring an overcharge claim. 22 The deadline is you just don't get damages for more than X 23 years before you brought the claim.

MR. VERNON: And that now has been plainly

cribers

JUDGE GARCIA: But - - -

24

| 1 | codified. But there never was one. We cited Christensen, |
|----|--|
| 2 | I think, and |
| 3 | JUDGE GARCIA: Wasn't the last one from the last |
| 4 | overcharge |
| 5 | MR. VERNON: That's how you calculate. |
| 6 | JUDGE GARCIA: Right, but if I wasn't |
| 7 | overcharging for four years under the prior statute, we're |
| 8 | done. |
| 9 | MR. VERNON: Absolutely. |
| LO | JUDGE GARCIA: Not true now? |
| 11 | MR. VERNON: No, it is still true. If you |
| L2 | weren't overcharging for four years, you don't owe me |
| L3 | anything. |
| L4 | JUDGE FAHEY: Well, six now, under the new |
| L5 | statute. |
| L6 | MR. VERNON: Sorry, six. |
| L7 | JUDGE FAHEY: But, yes. |
| L8 | MR. VERNON: You still don't owe me anything. |
| L9 | The issue I know you're concerned with is now I can go bac |
| 20 | a little further to try to find a reliable record. But |
| 21 | that's a perfectly fair way to deal with it, because if |
| 22 | this landlord has no reliable records for four, five, six, |
| 23 | ten years, that's a problem. That shouldn't inure to thei |
| 24 | benefit. |

None of the cases we have - - - the two cases I

| 1 | have here have that problem or any complaint |
|----|--|
| 2 | JUDGE FAHEY: So |
| 3 | MR. VERNON: about records. |
| 4 | JUDGE RIVERA: I understand these arguments to b |
| 5 | that they might not have records |
| 6 | MR. VERNON: Yes. |
| 7 | JUDGE RIVERA: because, as far as they |
| 8 | knew, under the law, they didn't have to keep records. |
| 9 | MR. VERNON: But what I mean to say is that in |
| 10 | these cases that we have argued to you, none of the owners |
| 11 | are complaining that they didn't have the records. |
| 12 | JUDGE RIVERA: That they didn't. |
| 13 | MR. VERNON: Okay. |
| 14 | JUDGE RIVERA: But but let's go with this |
| 15 | hypothetical |
| 16 | MR. VERNON: Just generally, yes. I understand. |
| 17 | JUDGE RIVERA: let's go with that |
| 18 | hypothetical. |
| 19 | MR. VERNON: Yes, so that so if they're |
| 20 | complaining they didn't have records |
| 21 | JUDGE RIVERA: Doesn't that mean, then, there's |
| 22 | no repose I think that's part of |
| 23 | MR. VERNON: Yes, I |
| 24 | JUDGE RIVERA: the question. |
| 25 | MR. VERNON: I understand. But I I |

pointed out earlier that one reason they needed records
anyway is that other cases did allow you to go back to
prove your regulation, and two, they should be able to
prove their rent. If they didn't keep records for twenty -
JUDGE STEIN: In some of these cases - -
MR. VERNON: - - - years - - - sorry.

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JUDGE STEIN: Counsel, in some of these cases, the landlord - - - the - - - the owners - - - the buildings changed hands along the way, right?

MR. VERNON: Um-hum. Um-hum.

JUDGE STEIN: And - - - and it seems to me that if you know that you - - - you may potentially be liable for overcharges and have to look back a long way to determine what those overcharges were, that if you're buying a building, you're going to require certain records from the prior owner - - -

MR. VERNON: Um-hum. Um-hum.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - and if the prior owner

doesn't have those records, well, that may affect the price

of the building or - - - or your calculation of whether

you're going to buy it. So it's not just a matter of well,

why should we encourage or reward these landlords for not

keeping records. I think it's a little more complicated

than that, don't you?



3 buyer didn't get records, he'd pay a lower price - - -4 JUDGE STEIN: Well, that's - - - yeah - - -5 MR. VERNON: - - - and he's get something for it, 6 and therefore the lack of repose, he's - - -7 JUDGE STEIN: But he - - - but he doesn't - - -8 MR. VERNON: - - - compensated for -9 JUDGE STEIN: - - - know to ask for the - - -10 MR. VERNON: - - - because me might - - - sorry. 11 JUDGE STEIN: - - - my point is he doesn't know 12 to ask for those records or - - - or negotiate the price 13 when the law changes on him retroactively. 14 MR. VERNON: Well, I don't - - - I don't agree 15 with that, because I think all landlords know these 16 regulations just change all the time. And they've changed 17 for twenty-five years toward the direction, for the most 18 part, of owners. And before that they were a little better 19 for tenants. And now they're changing back. And they're 20 changing back, in part, because they do think there was an 21 imbalance, and they said that in the legislation. 2.2 said - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: So that is one measure of the 24 reasonable expectations in a heavily regulated industry, 25 because that's what you're arguing.

MR. VERNON: Yeah, I do think it is more

complicated. But I think in your example, that when the

1

1 MR. VERNON: That is what I'm arguing; yes. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 3 MR. VERNON: That - - - that when you bought the 4 building, your expectation was it's regulated. You might 5 look back to '93 when, you know, there wasn't vacancy 6 deregulation. That might happen again. And it did happen 7 again. So things just changed around. 8 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The expectation that your 9 liability may be changed retrospectively? 10 MR. VERNON: Yes, I do think that's a fair - - -11 because it did change in the past. It changed for the 12 better in the past, and they didn't come complain then. 13 Tenants - - -14 JUDGE FEINMAN: What about the addition of the 15 two years versus the four years? 16 MR. VERNON: I think it's nominal. And I think 17 it's - - - I think it's something that was meant to balance 18 this and perhaps maybe create incentive, as Your Honor 19 pointed out, to not overcharge as much; maybe because they 20 thought many overcharges were occurring and not - - - and 21 the money wasn't being recouped and/or tenants were moving 2.2 out in deregulated apartments. So landlords had windfalls in that situation. 23 24 So I do think there are a lot of reasons that

they would come up with the six years. And it was their

prerogative - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. VERNON: - - - they could have shortened it - - they was a time they shortened it. Sorry.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you.

MR. VERNON: Thank you for hearing me.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MS. RIEGEL: Good afternoon. Deborah Riegel together with my colleague Ethan Cohen, from the law firm of Rosenberg & Estis, for the respondents.

I'd like to start with the certified question. I don't think there is any question - - - and I think there's a reason that Mr. Vernon assiduously stayed away from the certified question - - - there is no factual disputes that these tenants did not bring their claim within the time frame provided under 213-a. It is undisputed in the record. It's what the Supreme Court held, it's what the Appellate Division held.

And this is the landlord that did everything it should have done, post-Roberts. This landlord registered rents, provided rent-stabilized leases, and increased the rents only in accordance with guidelines, before retroactivity was determined.

Not only did the landlord do that, the landlord put these tenants on notice that they had a potential claim

under Roberts. And unlike the tenants in all of the cases you've heard before, today - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Are you - - - are you attempting to argue that the legislature could only pass a retroactive statute to impact bad-behaving landlords, as opposed to correct what it saw as an erroneous stream of rent?

MS. RIEGEL: So what I'm suggesting, Your Honor, is twofold. Number one - - - and - - - and Judge Stein alluded to it earlier - - - this is not a claim revival statute, in my view. And there's no question, notwithstanding Mr. Vernon's argument that there was no statute of limitations, that 213-a was a statute of limitations prior to the change in the law.

And Conason only held that there was an exception because they found there was fraud in this case. And in - - in our case, both the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division expressly held that there has been no fraud here. This is a landlord that only deregulated the unit in reliance on the pre-Roberts law and acted immediately to correct its conduct when Roberts was decided.

There's nothing in this statute - - - no language whatsoever - - - that makes it a claim-revival statute.

When you look at the language of the Child Victims Act, which was enacted by the very same session of this legislature, same members of the legislature, same

legislative bill drafters, the Child Victims Act is drastically different. It specifically says that every civil claim or cause of action is hereby revived. An action thereon may be commenced within a specified time frame.

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It goes on to say that "dismissal of a previous action ordered before the effective date of this section, on grounds that such previous action was time-barred, shall not be grounds for dismissal of a revival action, pursuant to this section."

There is nothing close to that in this statute.

And Judge Feinman did an exhaustive review, in In re World

Trade Center, of the claim-revival statutes that have pre - that have been held to be claim-revival statutes. They
all have one singular component. They tell you: we are
reviving this claim and we're reviving it for some period
of time, because of some extraordinary circumstance.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So if it's not claim revival, what is it?

MS. RIEGEL: It's a prospective statute. It does not apply to claims that have already been lost by virtue of the failure to act within the statute of limitations.

And - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Of course, that's - - - that's not what the legislature said.

| 1 | MS. RIEGEL: Well, because the legislature didn' |
|----|--|
| 2 | say it. And because the case law |
| 3 | JUDGE FAHEY: Well, they said they said th |
| 4 | opposite, actually, didn't they? |
| 5 | MS. RIEGEL: Well, they said it applies to |
| 6 | pending |
| 7 | JUDGE FAHEY: Taking them at their word, they |
| 8 | said it applies to pending claims. Let's assume it applie |
| 9 | to these claims, then? |
| 10 | MS. RIEGEL: Well, they said it applies to |
| 11 | pending claims. And I would suggest |
| 12 | JUDGE FAHEY: So so the argument is |
| 13 | think you tend to be I kind of agree with you. I - |
| 14 | - I don't think it's a claim-revival statute. It's a |
| 15 | question of whether these are pending claims, and then wha |
| 16 | evidence applies, I think. |
| 17 | I think I don't think it's a I think |
| 18 | that you're logical it's a logical argument you're |
| 19 | making. But that doesn't negate, though, the pending- |
| 20 | claims argument. |
| 21 | MS. RIEGEL: Well, when when you speak |
| 22 | about pending claims |
| 23 | JUDGE FAHEY: Assuming they're pending, then, of |
| 24 | course, the evidentiary arguments, yeah. |



MS. RIEGEL: Well - - -

| 2 | MS. RIEGEL: but when you talk about |
|----|--|
| 3 | pending claims, then the question is the distinction |
| 4 | between pending claims and pending actions and proceedings |
| 5 | JUDGE FAHEY: Okay. It's fine if you want to |
| 6 | argue that. I'm sure the other judges want to listen to |
| 7 | you, but I've never been impressed by that argument. |
| 8 | MS. RIEGEL: Okay. |
| 9 | JUDGE FAHEY: But but but I'm only |
| 10 | one guy. So |
| 11 | JUDGE STEIN: But just to clarify, you're |
| 12 | you're saying that this wasn't explicitly made a claim- |
| 13 | revival statute, but it has that effect. Am I |
| 14 | understanding you correctly? |
| 15 | MS. RIEGEL: No. I |
| 16 | JUDGE STEIN: Okay. |
| 17 | MS. RIEGEL: I'm saying it is not a claim- |
| 18 | revival statute. And the argument that Counsel is making |
| 19 | is to give it the effect of being a claim-revival statute, |
| 20 | notwithstanding that the legislature didn't do it. |
| 21 | JUDGE WILSON: Well, the portion of it that says |
| 22 | you can look at records that are older than four years in |
| 23 | determining what a reasonable rate is, you wouldn't say |
| 24 | that's a claim-revival statute, right? |
| 25 | MS. RIEGEL: I would agree that with respect to |

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

1 timely asserted rent-overcharge claim, that's not a revival 2 statute. But - - -3 JUDGE WILSON: That is, if somebody had filed 4 within four years, let's say, and the portion of the 5 statute that then says where you only - - - we were cabined 6 to four years, you can now look indefinitely back to try -7 - - you're not claiming that that's - - -MS. RIEGEL: I think there are other issues with 8 9 that that don't - - - don't obtain (sic) to this case and 10 this procedural - - -11 JUDGE WILSON: But you're not saying that makes 12 it a climb - - - a claim-revival statute. That's not your 13 argument? 14 MS. RIEGEL: No, my - - - my argument is that 15 with respect to claims that have lapsed by virtue of a statute of limitations that existed at the time the claim 16 17 was brought, it - - - they are not revived by virtue of - -18 19 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, but let me ask this. 20 there any other area of the law - - - statute of 2.1 limitations limit commencement. We started out today 2.2 talking about that. 23 Is there any other area of the law that 24 incorporates within it a statute of limitations that limits

evidence that you can present from a certain period?

Counsel on the other side says, well, okay, you - - -you've got an accident case, and the car was - - - is ten years old, and it was poorly designed, but the accident - -- but you brought your action within three years of the accident, you can go back and look at the design of the car. All of that proof comes in. There's no question If your elevator fails in this building when you live there, you can go back fifty years and look and see how the elevator was put together here, one way or the

other. What - - - why is this - - - this is such an unusual limitation. It - - - why is that? And why should the legislature not be able to modify that rule of evidence?

MS. RIEGEL: So in the first instance, it's - - -

it is - - - respectfully, it's predicated on an assumption that there was a timely claim.

JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. I - - - well - - -

MS. RIEGEL: And there - - - and there's not.

But - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: - - - the claim - - - the claim - - - the claim's always going to be timely. It's like we've - - - these are rolling claims. They're ongoing. So it was - - - so - - - so let's just assume it's within the four or six years. It doesn't matter to me which one you want to



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1
        talk about. I want to talk about the look-back period - -
2
        - the evidence that's admissible.
 3
                  MS. RIEGEL: We're not there, in this case, Your
        Honor.
 4
 5
                   JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
 6
                  MS. RIEGEL:
                                This was - - - this was dismissed on
 7
        a pre-answer motion to dismiss.
 8
                   JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, that's - - - I - - okay - -
 9
10
                  MS. RIEGEL:
                                There's - - -
11
                   JUDGE FAHEY: - - - I thought - - - it wasn't
12
        summary judgment?
13
                  MS. RIEGEL: No, this was pre-answer - -
14
                   JUDGE FAHEY: There was no summary judgment.
15
                  MS. RIEGEL: - - - motion to dismiss.
16
                   JUDGE FAHEY: - - - it was all pre-answer. Okay.
17
                  MS. RIEGEL:
                                There is no evidence in the record.
18
        Although I would point out to Your Honor that the
19
        plaintiffs not only - - - the appellants not only pleaded
20
        but moved for summary judgment on their allegation that
21
        this unit was previously owner-occupied, in which case, the
22
        rent they were charged was a first rent, which under the
23
        law, was not susceptible to challenge in the manner they're
24
        challenging it.
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This - - - a first rent is not a rent that is an

| 1 | increase over a prior rent, precisely because this unit was |
|----|---|
| 2 | temporarily exempt, and appellants not only pleaded it, but |
| 3 | moved for summary judgment on that basis. |
| 4 | So they have conceded that this was a first rent |
| 5 | And and I would point out that unlike the other |
| 6 | JUDGE FAHEY: So so |
| 7 | MS. RIEGEL: cases, we have |
| 8 | JUDGE FAHEY: so their motion was a motion |
| 9 | for summary judgment? |
| 10 | MS. RIEGEL: Well, they moved for summary |
| 11 | judgment before issue was joined. |
| 12 | JUDGE FAHEY: All right. All right. |
| 13 | MS. RIEGEL: But I would also point out |
| 14 | JUDGE FAHEY: I just wanted to make sure I didn' |
| 15 | read it wrong. All right, go ahead. |
| 16 | MS. RIEGEL: No, no, no. They did. They cross- |
| 17 | moved against my pre-answer motion to dismiss with a motion |
| 18 | for summary judgment, notwithstanding that we hadn't |
| 19 | answered. So |
| 20 | JUDGE FAHEY: I see. |
| 21 | MS. RIEGEL: it's a little procedurally - |
| 22 | _ |
| 23 | JUDGE FAHEY: Unusual. |
| 24 | MS. RIEGEL: strange. Strange. |
| 25 | I would also point out that we have six years of |

| 1 | registrations here. The minute Roberts was decided, my |
|----|--|
| 2 | client started registering these this unit. In 2010 |
| 3 | 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016; after all of those |
| 4 | years of registrations, the tenants woke up. |
| 5 | There and they have no explanation or no - |
| 6 | no reasonable explanation for why they didn't act at |
| 7 | any point like all of the other tenants who you've heard |
| 8 | from today did. |
| 9 | I I find it astonishing that they sat on |
| 10 | their rights and they |
| 11 | JUDGE RIVERA: I'm a little confused. How does |
| 12 | that affect the case? |
| 13 | MS. RIEGEL: Well, it affects the case because |
| 14 | the rationale that is advanced for going back |
| 15 | JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. |
| 16 | MS. RIEGEL: farther, or for allowing this |
| 17 | claim that Counsel makes, is that this was a bad actor. |
| 18 | This landlord was a bad actor. This landlord was no more |
| 19 | bad actor than any other landlord that got caught in the |
| 20 | Roberts trap. |
| 21 | JUDGE RIVERA: Do you understand the HSTPA to |
| 22 | apply only to landlords who are quote/unquote "bad actors" |
| 23 | MS. RIEGEL: No. |
| 24 | JUDGE RIVERA: I'm not quite sure what you mean |
| 25 | by that. |



| 1 | MS. RIEGEL: No, no, no. No. I it |
|----|---|
| 2 | it I the HSTPA applies to landlords who |
| 3 | whether intentionally or mistakenly |
| 4 | JUDGE RIVERA: Right. |
| 5 | MS. RIEGEL: overcharge their tenants. |
| 6 | JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. |
| 7 | MS. RIEGEL: There's no dispute about that. |
| 8 | JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. |
| 9 | MS. RIEGEL: But their suggest their |
| 10 | suggestion is you should allow them to bypass the statute |
| 11 | of limitations because they think there was something |
| 12 | nefarious going on here. That's their excuse for why the |
| 13 | statute of limitations |
| 14 | JUDGE FAHEY: Well, I well |
| 15 | MS. RIEGEL: shouldn't apply. |
| 16 | JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. |
| 17 | JUDGE FAHEY: I understood the argument to be |
| 18 | that that they want the 2019 changes to apply, not |
| 19 | that they should ignore the statute of limitations. |
| 20 | MS. RIEGEL: Well, but in applying the 2019 |
| 21 | changes in the law, in effect, they're asking you to ignore |
| 22 | a statute of limitations that bound them at the at a |
| 23 | time when they could have timely brought their claim. |
| 24 | There's no explanation. |



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And I just want to point out one last piece,

which is, with respect to retrospective application - - -1 2 JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum. 3 MS. RIEGEL: - - - this court has held that 4 retrospective application with respect to procedural steps 5 in case is not proper. Where there is a procedural act 6 that has already occurred, as here, a dismissal of the 7 action, retrospective application will not permit this 8 court or any court to look back and review that 9 determination. 10 So with respect to retrospective application on procedural steps - - - and there's no dispute in the law 11 12 that statute of limitations is a procedural step - - - that 13 that application has to be prospective only. 14 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 15 MS. RIEGEL: Thank you. 16 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel? 17 MR. VERNON: Please. A few quick things. 18 I - - - I don't make the claim that it's a claim 19 I make a claim that the statute says what it says 20 and that there are claims pending in front of this court, 21 because there's a certified question whether we should win 2.2 or lose, and that's our claim, so it's pending. 23 Second, the renewal - - - the leases that we were 24 given, number one, as Your Honor said, it doesn't really

matter under the HSTPA what we were given. They have to be

examined if they're reliable records. That's best done on 1 2 remand. But we were not given stabilized leases. We were 3 given a renewal lease, based on an unlawfully deregulated 4 lease. 5 And that renewal lease said in it, anew, with 6 each renewal, that we're all reserving our rights. 7 landlord said - - -8 JUDGE FEINMAN: When you say an "unlawfully 9 deregulated lease", why? 10 MR. VERNON: Because it was the lease in 2005 11 that was deregulated and had a deregulated rent. They only 12 then gave us a renewal in 2010, based on that. You can't 13 do that, under stabilization. You have to give an initial 14 stabilized lease. You have to give riders that say how you 15 calculated the rent. They did nothing of the sort. 16 They gave a rider that said we did a good-faith 17 determ - - - calculation. They've never said what it was,

because - - -

JUDGE FEINMAN: So you're disputing her contention that because it was owner-occupied it was exempt, and this is a first rent?

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MR. VERNON: Oh, yeah. We - - - we're disputing that. What we said in the - - - there was - - - no such thing was said. We said on information and belief, the prior owner - - - the prior tenant was maybe an owner. But then we put the records in, which are in the record before the court, and they show it was, for the most part not registered for some twenty years, and at times registered as exempt with no explanation.

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So we say that on remand, it's just up to them.

They want to prove some wonderful reliable record, they can do that. But those renewals each said we're not even sure you're stabilized; we're - - - we'll adjust the rent if we're required to do so.

So they were saying to us that they were not taking repose, as Your Honor puts it, in these renewals.

They were not saying anything like that. They were saying we're all waiting to see, but Gersten has to be decided on retroactivity, and then we're going to see.

Then Gersten was decided, and they still gave us very similar renewals saying we're still not sure. We're not sure you're stabilized.

When we finally sued them was when, in 2016, they gave us a renewal saying now you're stabilized; here's your rent; but we're going to deregulate you in three months, because the J-51 is going to expire. Sorry we didn't attach all the riders and tell you about that - - - which was required. That's when the case was brought.

And - - - and that's why it took time. And on a 3211 motion, none of this could come out. We certainly



submit that 3211 was an entirely inappropriate way to deal with this case when we made sufficient allegations, and for sure under the HSTPA, we have a valid claim. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. MR. VERNON: Thank you for hearing me. (Court is adjourned)



CERTIFICATION I, Penina Wolicki, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Elizabeth Reich and Stanlee Brimberg v. Belnord Partners, LLC and Extell Belnord, LLC, No. 4 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Penina waich. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: January 14, 2020

